This paper considers an infinite-horizon principal-agent model with moral hazard. Following the insights of Grossman and Hart (1983) and the methodology of recursive contracts we are able to establish properties of the optimal dynamic contract analytically. We solve the contracting problem numerically, simulate the long-run distributions of discounted utility (the state variable) for different initial conditions, and calculate the moments of the policy functions. This allows us to further our understanding of the trade-offs between current and deferred compensation in the provision of incentives. Furthermore, since we can obtain first-order conditions for the principal's optimization problem, we assess the accuracy of numerical solutions using the first-order conditions' residuals. Finally, we compute the cost-minimizing contracts under different contractual arrangements and calculate the corresponding effects on the surplus of the principal and of the agent.
Introduction
This paper studies an infinite-horizon principal-agent model with moral hazard. The principal hires an agent to complete a certain task every period throughout the duration of the contract. As in the static principal-agent model the contract must ensure the agent's participation by offering a level of expected utility that is at least as large as some reservation level determined by market conditions. And since the principal cannot observe the behavior of the agent, incentives are needed to ensure that the agent follows the recommendations of the principal. Since we have added the time dimension, the design of incentives is slightly more delicate as the presence of time enlarges the set of rewards and punishments that can be offered. The principal cannot only punish or reward the agent within any given period of time, but also over time. Thus, a dynamic model gives rise to another trade-off, the one between current compensation and deferred compensation as incentive tools. Hence, as a first objective, we want to further our understanding of this trade-off in alternative settings involving long-term contracts. As a second objective, we want to be able to characterize the optimal dynamic contract analytically, in a similar way to existing characterizations of static contracts. Finally, we want to introduce some degree of discipline to the computation of dynamic contracts, as in existing computations of optimal growth models.
To an extent that we make precise later, we formulate the principal-agent model as an extension of Grossman and Hart (1983) to an infinite horizon. In their seminal paper Grossman and Hart formulate the contracting problem in the space of utility levels instead of the space of wage levels. This allows them to rewrite the constraints as a set of linear inequalities. Furthermore, they split the contracting problem into two parts. First, the principal chooses the costminimizing contract for each level of effort. Second, the principal implements the level of effort that maximizes the principal's profit. We follow a similar approach, and by focusing on a particular effort profile we are able to characterize the optimal contract analytically. Furthermore, since we can formulate first-order conditions for the contracting problem, we use them to compute the residual of the numerical approximations in the numerical solution of the contracting problem, and in this way we can assess the quality of our computations.
We employ the methodology of recursive contracts pioneered by Spear and Srivastava (1987) where the expected discounted utility of the agent is treated as the state variable. Following this approach the optimal contract can be constructed recursively with a pair of time-invariant policy functions. We are interested in the properties of these policy functions and also in computing them. In dynamic programs with incentive constraints the set of discounted utilities that allows for a feasible optimal contract is endogenous. Consequently, it must be obtained from the primitives of the model. For this we use the iterative procedure of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) , henceforth APS, and obtain the state space as the fixed point of a set-valued operator.
The optimal contract is described by a pair of policy functions that minimize the cost of compensation. This minimization problem defines a dynamic programming operator whose fixed point is shown to be a convex and differentiable value function. The control variables in this minimization problem are two policy functions; one policy function determines the compensation received by the agent, whereas the other policy function specifies the value of the continuation of the contract for any given history of the observable outcome. This second policy function partially defines a transition function for the state variable. We find that both functions are increasing in the value of the observable outcome and in the value of the state. Furthermore, our computations show that as the value of the state increases, most of the variability needed to satisfy incentive compatibility is shifted to current compensation. In terms of the dynamics of compensation, we find the following results. First, there exists a threshold value of the observable outcome that separates the reward zone from the punishment zone. In fact, following good performance the agent is rewarded in the present and in the future, and following poor performance the agent is punished in the present and in the future. In their pioneering work, Spear and Srivastava (1987) found similar results assuming differentiability of the policy functions and the validity of the first-order approach. Second, viewed as a stochastic process, the marginal cost of deferred compensation follows a martingale, and thus it forms a convergent sequence. For different initial values of the state variable, we find a time-invariant distribution of expected discounted utilities. Although we have not yet established this formally, Monte Carlo simulations suggest that with respect to the value of the initial state, the long-run distributions of discounted utilities are ordered according to first-order stochastic dominance.
Our numerical analysis also compares the solution to the contracting problem under full commitment with the solutions to two other contracting problems. First, we compare the model with full commitment with a model where only the principal can commit to the contract. The agent is allowed to abandon the contract at the beginning of any period unless the principal adjusts the contract so that its continuation is at least as valuable as an outside option. We find that the cost of the contract increases by a higher amount in those states where the reservation utility is higher, and that relative to the full-commitment contract, current compensation under limited commitment exhibits more variability. Second, we compare the optimal contract with full commitment with an arrangement where the principal restricts the class of current compensation policy functions to constant functions of the observable outcome, though the current wage is allowed to change with the value of the state. This is the recursive version of a contract that offers a flat salary every period, which is adjusted at the beginning of next period based on the current period's performance. We find that since deferred compensation is the only source of variability, the cost of compensation increases significantly more for high values of the state, which lends further support to the finding that for high values of discounted utility current compensation is a more prominent incentive tool. We compute the first and second moments of the policy functions and find that the restricted policy functions practically match the first moments of the unrestricted policy functions, and that the second moment of the restricted continuation is uniformly higher than the second moment of the unrestricted optimal continuation.
The computational experiments that we carried suggest that relatively high degrees of accuracy can be attained with relatively small computational cost. For instance, in all our computations the stochastic observable outcome is described by a continuous variable. For computational tractability we considered a discretized version of the exogenous state space and of the endogenous state space. In the computation of the endogenous state space the linearity of the constraints allowed us to use linear programming routines to quickly and accurately compute the state space. Even with 15 grid points over the exogenous state space and 100 grid points over the endogenous state space convergence to the fixed point was attained in less than one minute of CPU time. Subsequently, the dynamic programming problem was solved using value-function iteration, and interpolation schemes were employed to obtain the continuous versions of the policy functions. Even with a rather coarse discretization of the state space (5 grid points in the exogenous state space and 30 grid points in the endogenous state space) the highest value of the residual in the first-order condition was in the neighborhood of 5 × 10 −4 . There is by now a large number of papers that employ the so called recursive contracts approach to study dynamic relations under a variety of assumptions especially regarding commitment. Therefore, an overlap between the work presented here and existing work in the literature is inevitable. Perhaps closest to this paper is the work of Wang (1997) . He formulates and computes a dynamic principal-agent model to illustrate that the optimal contract can indeed exhibit low variability with respect to performance. He also derives the state space endogenously using the APS algorithm. In addition to the important insights in his paper, we offer an analytical characterization of the contract, an analysis of the accuracy of numerical solutions, and an analysis of the stationary distributions of the state variable. Thomas and Worral (1990) discovered a result that later became known as immiserization. They consider an adverse selection model and use dynamic programming to characterize efficient debt contracts in an environment where the agent is subject to random income shocks that are private information. An important result of their paper is that if utility is unbounded below, over time the agent's level of indebtedness gets arbitrarily large. In other words, the agent's expected discounted utility converges to minus infinity with probability one. The reason for this is that inducing truth-telling is easier when expected discounted utility is low. Hence current consumption can be smoothed out by increasing current utility at the expense of lower utility in the future. In our model, for a wide range of initial discounted utilities, we obtain non-degenerate long-run distributions of discounted utility with support contained in the endogenous state space.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we specify the model and establish the connection between the original problem in sequence form and the recursive formulation. The subsequent section characterizes the optimal contract analytically and discusses some properties regarding the monotonicity and the dynamics of compensation. In Section 4 we focus on the numerical computation of the model and on the analysis of the approximation error. Finally, in Section 5 we offer some concluding remarks.
The Model
The contracting problem involves a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent. Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, . . . . Every period the agent ranks combinations of consumption and effort according to a utility function φ : R × R → R. To fix ideas we consider utility functions that are additively separable in consumption and effort; i.e., φ(c, e) = g(c) − e.
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Assumption 1 The agent's utility over consumption g : R + → R is twicecontinuously differentiable with g > 0 and g < 0.
1 The analysis can be extended with minor alterations to the case of exponential utility with multiplicatively separable consumption and effort φ(c, e) = − exp(−(c − e)).
Assumption 2 The set of available levels of effort is E = {e, e} ⊂ R, where e < e for t = 0, 1, . . . .
Assumption 3
The observable outcome y t follows a stochastic process described by a probability distribution conditional upon effort: Pr(y t ≤ y; e t = e) = P (y; e).
Every period, the observable outcome can be either a discrete or a continuous random variable. Thus, for each e ∈ E, the function p(·; e) represents the density associated to P (·; e) when y is a continuous random variable, or the probability mass function when y is a discrete random variable.
Assumption 4
The functions p(·; e) and p(·; e) satisfy the monotone likelihood ratio property: p(·; e)/p(·; e) is nonincreasing in y.
Assumption 5 The principal and the agent discount the future according to a common discount factor β.
At a point in time, say t = 0, the principal offers a contract to the agent. A contract σ specifies a sequence of compensation functions, and a sequence of effort functions:
. On the day the contract has been offered, the principal calculates the expected discounted profit of the relationship to be
where E[·|e] = Y [·]P (dy t ; e) denotes the expectation operator with respect to the probability distribution induced by effort e. This clearly assumes that the principal recommends effort e at least the first period. Later in the paper we argue that interesting results can be obtained when the same effort level is considered every period. Therefore, we redefine σ = {w t (h t ), e}
A contract σ induces a stochastic process of wages that the agent orders according to the expected discounted utility that it yields. Moreover, at any date t ≥ 0 the agent has a market value worth ω t units of discounted utility. This can be interpreted as the expected discounted utility that the agent would obtain from working elsewhere. Therefore, the agent will accept the principal's offer if
Finally, the agent will find it beneficial to choose the recommended effort profile over any profile {e t } t≥0 ∈ E ∞ only if the following incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied:
The principal's optimization problem will consist of maximizing (1) subject to (2)- (3) and an enforcement constraint depending on the type of commitment considered in the model. For instance, if we consider a model where the principal commits and the agent does not, we would add a constraint specifying that at the beginning of every period the value of the continuation of the contract must be at least as large as the agent's reservation utility. Since changing the commitment assumptions requires one additional constraint, for the remainder of the section we work with the model involving (2)- (3) and add the corresponding enforcement constraints when necessary.
As shown in Grossman and Hart (1983) , it is convenient to express the optimal contracting problem in the space of utility levels rather than in the space of wage levels. Therefore, let u t (h t ) = g(w t (h t )) denote the period t utility enjoyed by the agent when compensated with w t (h t ) following history h t . Then, note that w t (h t ) = s(u t (h t )), where s is the inverse of g. With this change of variables, the principal is interested in providing the agent with utility levels that maximize a concave objective function over a convex set. Furthermore, observe that the optimal contract can be obtained by minimizing (2) and (3). Henceforth, we will substitute w t (h t ) for u t (h t ) in σ and concentrate on the minimization of the cost of compensation for a given effort profile.
One difficulty with this problem is ensuring incentive compatibility, since it appears that the principal would have to ensure incentive compatibility with respect to an infinite number of deviations. Green (1987) simplified this problem tremendously by establishing that staying on the optimal path requires verifying temporary incentive compatibility. To see this note that (3) can be rewritten as the sum of the first period's utility plus the continuation of the contract:
where
− e|e is the expected discounted utility from continuation σ 1 (y 0 ). Similarly, we can also specify the cost that this continuation represents to the principal, C(v(σ 1 (y 0 ))).
Employing this notation, from t = 0 the optimal contract σ is determined by the solution to the following minimization problem:
subject to
As already mentioned, both constraints are linear in u t and the objective function is convex (s is the inverse of g). Therefore, we are indeed solving a convex minimization problem. If we were to consider an agent who cannot commit to the contract and that might quit at the beginning of every period, we would add the following enforceability constraint: v(σ t (y t−1 )) ≥ ω t for t ≥ 1. This problem is clearly recursive since at any date we can break the contract into its current value and its continuation. To see this recursivity, suppose that at the end of period t the agent's reservation utility is ω t and that the output realization is y t . Then, the agent enjoys u t (y t ) − e in that period, and expects utility v(σ t+1 (y t )) from next period onward. Similarly, the principal retains y t − s(u t (y t )) and expects to spend C(v(σ t+1 (y t ))) from next period onward. Now, at the beginning of t + 1 the agent's reservation utility is ω t+1 and the output realization is y t+1 . Then, the agent enjoys u t+1 (y t+1 ) − e, and so on. Following dynamic programming arguments, we will focus on time-invariant policy functions to characterize the solution to P1).
We are now ready to specify the recursive problem more formally. Let V ⊂ R be an interval containing the values of all feasible continuation values v, and also reservation utilities ω. Then, let u : Y × V → R and v : Y × V → V , defined by u(y, ω) and v(y, ω) respectively, denote the the current utility and the continuation utility following realization y and assuming the agent's reservation utility is ω. Given these functions, the agent will accept the contract if
and effort e will be chosen if
It follows that solutions to (P1) can be obtained solving the following functional equation:
where Γ(ω) denotes the correspondence of pairs (u, v) that are feasible from ω. More precisely,
This functional equation is solved as follows. Let B denote the space of bounded and continuous functions and endow B with the sup norm. Define the dynamic programming operator as follows:
Following standard results from dynamic programming it is not difficult to show that T is a contraction mapping with modulus β. Therefore, by the Contraction Mapping Theorem it possesses a unique fixed point C * (ω) such that (T C * )(ω) = C * (ω). Hence, computationally speaking, C * is derived through value-function iteration.
Applying results from Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) it can be shown that the principle of optimality holds and thus paths constructed recursively with the policy functions u and v attain the minimum of the sequence problem. Therefore, from this point forward we rely on solutions to the dynamic program to characterize the optimal contract.
One last caveat remains. We have treated the space V (the domain of the value function) as given, when in fact it must be obtained from the primitives of the contracting problem. In Section 4 we obtain V and also compute it applying the methodology of self generation and factorization developed by Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) to our contracting problem.
The Optimal Contract
The basic problem in a static principal-agent model with moral hazard is the optimal provision of insurance and incentives. Insurance is needed in order to allure a risk-averse agent into participating in the contract, and incentives are needed to make sure the agent finds it beneficial to follow the effort recommendations of the principal. In a dynamic setting, the set of arrangements is richer than in a static setting since punishments and rewards can be distributed over time. Hence, an important issue that must be tackled by the optimal dynamic contract is the optimal mix of current and future compensation in the provision of insurance and incentives. The work of Spear and Srivastava (1987) and Wang (1997) provides some useful insights on these properties. Here we extend their analysis and investigate further the properties of the dynamic contract numerically.
Optimality Properties
Our discussion begins establishing some basic properties of the value function defined by the dynamic programming operator T . It is well known from the dynamic programming literature that the value function inherits properties of the reward function. In our case the reward function s if convex and twicecontinuously differentiable. As the next results state, the value function C is convex and continuously differentiable.
Proposition 1
The value function C : V → R is convex.
Proof: See Theorem 4.8 in Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) .
Proposition 2 The value function C : V → R is continuously differentiable.
Proof: See Theorem 4.11 in Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott (1989) .
These results ensure that the right side of T involves a convex differentiable minimization problem. Therefore, one can use the Khun-Tucker conditions to solve the minimization problem specified by the dynamic programming operator.
The Lagrangian for this minimization problem is given by
Observe that λ : V → R and µ : V → R are the Lagrange multipliers associated to (5) and (6) respectively. The first-order conditions with respect to u and v in the interior of V are given by
C (v(y, ω)) = λ + µ 1 − p(y; e) p(y; e) .
In addition to requiring that (5) and (6) are satisfied, optimality requires λ ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0, and
Finally, we also have the envelope condition
Furthermore, combining (7) and (8) we obtain an interesting optimality rule. For each y ∈ Y , the principal equates the marginal benefit of reducing current utility to the marginal cost of increasing future utility
Indeed, suppose that s (u(y, ω)) > C (v(y, ω)), then the principal could increase profits by shifting some utility from the present to the future. In fact, given that now the set of incentives is richer, the principal can always accommodate the levels of compensation to efficiently distribute incentives over time. Also, note that by the convexity of the value function, present and future compensation move in the same direction following either an innovation in firm's performance (changes in y) or a change in the value of the state variable. The following propositions establish the monotonicity of u and v with respect to y and ω.
Proposition 3 The policy functions u and v satisfy (i) u(·, ω) is nondecreasing in y and u(y, ·) is nondecreasing in ω.
(ii) v(·, ω) is nondecreasing in y and v(y, ·) is nondecreasing in ω Proof: Using the envelope condition the first-order conditions with respect to u and v can be written as
Note that (i)-(ii) follow immediately from the convexity of s and C.
Proposition 4 For any ω ∈ V , µ > 0, and thus the incentive compatibility constraint binds at the solution.
Proof: Suppose that for some ω ∈ V we have µ = 0. Then, from the firstorder conditions we obtain that u and v are constant functions of y, violating incentive compatibility.
The Behavior of Compensation over Time
To shed some light over the behavior of compensation over time, consider an initial state ω 0 ∈ V and an initial realization y 0 ∈ Y . Then, the expected discounted utility of the contract as of the beginning of period t = 1 must be ω 1 = v(y 0 , ω 0 ). More generally, for any t ≥ 0 we have ω t+1 = v(y t , ω t ). Therefore, for any sequence of realizations {y t } ∞ t=0 , we can define a sequence of states {ω t } ∞ t=0 by ω t+1 = v(y t , ω t ). In this section we are interested in the shortterm and long-term behavior of this sequence, and on its implications regarding the dynamics of compensation.
Proposition 5 Let ω ∈ V . There exists y ∈ Y such that if y ≥ y, then ω ≤ v(y, ω), and if y < y, then ω > v(y, ω).
Proof: From the first-order condition with respect to v we obtain
which using the envelope condition can be expressed as
By the MLRP there exists y ∈ Y such that p(y; e) ≥ p(y; e) for y ≤ y and p(y; e) < p(y; e) otherwise. Since µ ≥ 0, it follows that when y > y, C (v(y, ω)) > C (ω), which by the convexity of C(·) implies that v(y, ω) > ω. In a similar way, if y ≤ y, then v(y, ω) ≤ ω. By Proposition 3 the current utility policy function u is monotonically increasing in y. Combining this result with Proposition 5 we have that a change in y in any given period will affect current and future compensation, since for y ≥ y both u and v increase, and the increase in v puts the agent in a higher state the next period. If y < y the reverse is true.
Proposition 6
The stochastic process defined by {C (ω t )} ∞ t=0 is a martingale.
Proof: Recall that by definition ω t+1 = v(y t , ω t ). The envelope condition and the first-order condition show that
Therefore, integrating this expression with respect to P (·; e) we obtain
which establishes the result. The rest of this section consists of showing that the policy function v together with the distribution of y defines a transition function Q on Y × V , and that there exists a probability distribution that is invariant under Q.
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Given v and a distribution over Y , consider the sequence {y t } ∞ t=0 which by Assumption 2 is a sequence of independently and identically distributed random variables. Let {ω t } be defined by ω t+1 = v(y t , ω t ). For any ω ∈ V and A ⊆ V let
is a correspondence that yields the inverse of v. As shown below, Q is a transition. The value Q(ω, A) yields the probability that discounted utility in period t + 1 will be in the interval A given that discounted utility is ω in period t.
Proposition 7 Let Q be defined as in (10). Then, Q is a transition on V , and it has at least one invariant distribution.
Proof: That Q is a transition on V follows from Theorem 8.9 in SLP. By the Theorem of the Maximum v is a continuous function, and therefore Q has the Feller property. It follows from Theorem 12.10 in SLP that Q has at least one invariant distribution.
Quantitative Exercises
In this section we compute the domain of the value function C in the dynamic programming problem, and also the optimal contract for a given parameterization of the model. Once we obtain a numerical version of the contract, we use the computational tool to simulate sample paths and offer some insights on the long-run behavior of compensation. Additionally, we compare alternative dynamic models of moral hazard and study their solutions in terms of the cost of compensation and the characteristics of the solution in each case.
The State Space
The first step toward computing the optimal contract is the computation of the domain of the value function. This is the endogenous state space of the system or the set of discounted utilities for which there exists a pair of policy functions satisfying (5) and (6). Our computation relies on the iterative procedure detailed in Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990) . The APS algorithm allows us to obtain the state space as the fixed point of a set-valued operator. The following are the steps that one would follow to implement the APS algorithm and derive the endogenous state space. In order to explain the procedure with detail, we need some definitions.
Definition 1 For any interval W ⊆ R, a pair of policy functions (u,v) is admissible with respect to W if (u, v) ∈ Γ(ω) for every ω ∈ W Definition 2 (APS Operator) Let P(R) denote the power set of R. Then, for each W ∈ P(R), the operator B : P(R) → P(R) defined by
is admissible with respect to W } is the set of admissible current and continuation utilities.
That is, the image of W under B is the interval of values ω for which there exist functions u and v that are feasible from ω ∈ W .
Definition 3 An interval W ⊆ R is self-generating if W ⊆ B(W )
That is, an interval of the real line is self generating if it is a subset of its image under B. Note that this means that ω ∈ W can be written as the sum of current and continuation utilities such that taking e is incentive compatible.
Proposition 8 (Self-generation) Let W ⊆ R and assume that W is a selfgenerating set. Then, B(W ) ⊆ V .
Proof: Choose ω ∈ W . Since W is self-generating, it must be that ω ∈ B(W ) and hence by Definition 2 the pair of policy functions (u, v) is admissible with respect to W . Therefore, (u, v) satisfies individual rationality and incentive compatibility against one-period deviations. Hence, it recursively defines a sequence contract that satisfies the participation constraint, and by Greene (1987) , (u, v) recursively define a contract that satisfies incentive compatibility against arbitrary deviations. Therefore, for an arbitrary ω in the self-generating set W the stationary policies (u, v) recursively define a contract that satisfies the constraints of the contracting problem. Consequently, B(W ) ⊆ V
Proposition 9 (Factorization) V = B(V ).
Proof: Choose ω ∈ V . Then, by definition of V there exists a contract that satisfies the promise keeping and the incentive compatibility constraints. This contract can be constructed recursively with policy functions (u, v) . Therefore, (u, v) is an admissible pair of policy functions and thus ω ∈ B(V ). Since our choice of ω was arbitrary, it follows that V ⊆ B(V ) or that V is self-generating and by Proposition 8 B(V ) ⊆ V . Therefore we have V ⊆ B(V ) ⊆ V .
We have thus established that V is a fixed point of the APS operator B(·). Therefore, it can be obtained iteratively staring with an initial interval W 0 . Convergence to V is ensured by the ensuing result.
Proposition 10 Let W 0 ⊆ R be a compact set such that V ⊂ W , and for n ≥ 1 let W n = B(W n−1 ). Then, {W n } n≥1 is a decreasing sequence such that lim n→∞ W n = V Proof: See Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1990).
Numerical Solution
Given the state space Y × V , the numerical implementation of the dynamic programming algorithm requires a discretization of each dimension. After V has been obtained, we take K interpolation nodes over V and N interpolation nodes over Y . Therefore, the discretized version of Y × V becomes (1), . . . , y(N )} × {ω (1), . . . , ω(K)} where y(1) < y(2) < · · · < y(N ) and ω(1) < ω(2) < · · · < ω(K). For a probability distribution P (·; e) over Y , and for N + 1 grid points, the values of p(y(j); e) are calculated in the following way: p(y(j); e) = P (y(j + 1); e) − P (y(j); e) for j = 1, . . . , (N + 1).
Therefore, for each ω(k) ∈ V , where k = 1, . . . , K, a numerical optimal contract is described by σ(k) = {u(y(1)), . . . , u(y(N )), v(y(1)), . . . , v(y(N ))} .
That is, for each ω(k) ∈ V , the numerical version of policy function u is the 1 × N vector {u j (k)} The observable outcome y t is drawn from the time-invariant interval Y = [0.55, 1.70] according to a normal distribution with mean 1.04 and standard deviation 0.261 when e = e, and according to a normal distribution with mean 1.08 and standard deviation 0.274 when e = e. The values for Y and E were taken from the calibration in Aseff and Santos (2004) , where the effort levels satisfy the estimate in Margiotta and Miller (2000) that e/e = 1.17. Once we establish the parameterization of the model, the first step of the computational procedure is the derivation of the state space. For this we implement the APS algorithm numerically, where we heavily exploit the linearity of the constraints. Observe that every time we apply B to an interval W we must check that there exists a feasible pair (u, v) when the reservation utility is ω ∈ W . Numerically this means that we must determine whether there exists a candidate solution to a linear programming problem constrained by Γ(ω). This is typically the first step of the simplex algorithm. Heuristically, the computation of V proceeds as follows. Consider first a large set W 0 that is likely to contain V . Then, for a discretization {ω (1) For different initial intervals W 0 we computed V = B(V ) and in all cases convergence to V was achieved relatively quickly. Information regarding the computation of V is presented in Table 1 . All the computations of V take 100 equally spaced nodes at every iteration.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
The smallest W 0 considered was the interval
corresponding to the interval ranging from highest effort and no consumption every period to lowest effort and highest consumption every period. The feasibility of the policy functions at every iteration was checked using the linear programming routine linprog from MATLAB's optimization toolbox. The value function, and hence the optimal contract, is computed through value-function iteration using Chebychev approximation. For the computations illustrated below we used 30 Chebychev interpolation nodes over V and 5 Chebychev interpolation nodes over Y . The iterative procedure stops once the difference between two successive iterations is smaller than a prespecified tolerance level. The constrained minimization problem is solved using the constrained minimization routine fmincon from MATLAB's optimization toolbox. (A more careful exposition of this procedure appears under the heading Algorithm 2 in the Appendix.)
To analyze the properties of the optimal contract we center the discussion around the level of compensation and the variability of compensation. Analyzing the level of compensation will shed some light over the insurance features of the contract, and the analysis of the variability of the contract will shed some light over the incentive features of the contract. To avoid ambiguities, note that by variability of the contract we mean the response of u and v to changes in y.
In Figure 1 we illustrate the resulting value function. As it was established analytically, we obtain a convex, smooth function of ω.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
As expected, the value function increases with the state variable. Also, in panel (a) of Figure 2 we have the levels of current compensation as a function of the observable outcome y and the state ω. Note that as ω increases, so does the variability of current compensation. This point is further illustrated in the top row of Figure 3 , where we have w(·, ω) for ω ∈ {−0.1706, 4.1918, 8.8265}.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
The policy function corresponding to discounted utility is shown in panel (b) of Figure 2 . One can see that as ω increases, the per-period variability of future utility decreases. This point is further illustrated in the bottom row of Figure 3 , where we have v(·, ω) for ω ∈ {−0. 1706, 4.1918, 8.8265} . In other words, agents with high reservation utility are induced to exert high effort through contracts with higher current variability. Thus, as ω increases, current compensation becomes a more prominent incentive tool. A similar finding is discussed in the two-outcome model in Wang (1997) .
[ INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] One advantage of our setting is that considering constant effort profiles allows us to obtain first-order conditions for the minimization problem in Bellman's equation. These first-order conditions can be used to compute the residual of the numerical approximation. From expression (9) above we know that at the solution it must be the case that s (u(y, ω)) = C (v(y, ω)) for all y ∈ Y . Therefore, we define the residual by
where u and v denote the approximants of u and v respectively over the state space Y × V . Obviously, u(y, ω) = u(y, ω) and v(y, ω) = v(y, ω) at the Chebychev interpolation nodes (y, ω). The residuals shown in Figure 4 correspond to an equally spaced grid of 20 grid points over Y and 40 grid points over V . As one can see, even though we only used 5 interpolation nodes over Y , the residuals in the interior of the state space are zero to a precision of 10 −8 .
[ INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
Simulations
We now employ Monte Carlo methods to describe the long-run distribution of discounted utility. Using the model with full commitment, we generated 1000 time paths of 30 periods each. For t = 1, 2, . . . , 30 the observable outcome y t ∼ N (1.08, 0.274). Our simulations show clearly the influence of the initial ω on the time-invariant distribution of utility entitlements and suggest that the long-term distributions are ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. In Table 2 we have some descriptive statistics for our simulations and Figure 5 illustrates distributions for four initial states.
[ INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] An interesting aspect of these simulations is that agents with lower initial discounted utility attain a proportionally higher average utility entitlement. For instance, an agent beginning with ω 0 = 1.6311 attains an average long-run utility of 2.1616 or a 32% increase; whereas an agent beginning with ω 0 = 8.1422 attains an average long-run utility of 8.3260 or a 5.15% increase.
[ INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE] For the same initial conditions, we have also simulated the time paths of average discounted utilities. In Figure 6 we see that they increase over time. This illustration suggests that the agent gets richer over time. It should be noted that Green (1987) and Phelan (1995) found a similar result in models of adverse selection. Phelan (1995) interprets his increasing average consumption as a public way for firms to store consumption. In our case; however, this result is troublesome; since at least for this specific example it suggests that over time the principal transfers more wealth on average to the agent.
[ INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE] 
Other Contractual Arrangements
The computational procedure can be modified quickly to consider alternative specifications of the model. In this way one can obtain quantitative assessments of the welfare effects that follow from an alternative specification. First, as in Phelan (1995) , we consider a model with one-sided commitment where the principal is the party that commits to the contract. Second, since several observed contracts are based on flat per-period wages that are subject to change from year to year, and since deferred compensation is an additional source of variable compensation, we take a rather extreme environment and compare the optimal contract of the previous subsection with a contract whose only incentive tool is deferred compensation.
Limited Commitment
The recursive version of the model with limited commitment is almost identical to (P2) above. The only difference is that the optimal contract must ensure that every period the continuation of the contract does not fall below a given reservation utility determined by the market. This reservation utility is exogenously given by ω ∈ int(V ). Hence, the additional enforceability constraint is that v(y, ω) ≥ ω for all y ∈ Y . In this case the functional equation to be solved is
where Γ lc denotes the feasible correspondence where in addition to (5) and (6) the policy function v lc must also satisfy the constraint v lc (y, ω) ≥ ω. Given that we are introducing an additional constraint to the minimization problem, it will be the case that C lc (ω) ≥ C(ω), where C is the value function in (P1). Indeed, panel (b) of Figure 7 clearly illustrates this point.
[ INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE] Moreover, since for higher values of ω the principal must offer a higher minimum discounted utility, the additional cost of limited commitment would rise as well.
In terms of the optimal contract, recall that the enforceability constraint truncates expected discounted utility, and thus it bounds the ability of deferred compensation to incentivize the agent to exert effort e. Consequently, as Figure  8 illustrates, current compensation becomes significantly steeper than in the fullcommitment case. Also, note in Figure 9 that the enforceability constraint binds for low realizations of y, and that for these values of y, v lc (y, ω) > v(y, ω). Thus, the cost of compensation increases as a result of the participation constraint, and because the variability needed to satisfy incentive compatibility is attained by transferring a larger share of the output to the agent is in the higher end of the distribution of y.
[ INSERT FIGURE 8 HERE] [ INSERT FIGURE 9 HERE] 
Constant Current Compensation
A large number of observed contracts are based on constant annual salaries, adjustable from period to period depending on last period's performance. That is, the state to be determined this period will define current compensation the subsequent period. By focusing on policy functions for current compensation that exhibit no variability over a given period we are passing on all the variability needed to satisfy incentive compatibility to deferred compensation. As a result we would expect an increase in the cost of the contract.
The dynamic programming problem solved by the principal in this case is given by the following functional equation:
where Γ f denotes the feasible correspondence when one restricts attention to policy functions u f : V → R and v f : Y × V → V . The computations stemming from this restricted contracting problem under the parameterization specified above are compared with those stemming from the optimal contracting problem. Since (P3) is a special case of (P2), it must be the case that C f (ω) ≥ C(ω) for all ω ∈ V . For the same computations as above, Figure 10 below illustrates both C f and C.
[ INSERT FIGURE 10 HERE] The difference between the two value functions is surprisingly small, and it increases significantly for high values of the sate. Recall from the optimal contract that for high values of the state current compensation becomes more important as an incentive tool. Since in this case current compensation is not allowed to change with the value of y, the incentive compatibility constraint will not be satisfied as efficiently and as a consequence compensating the agent will become more expensive.
Turning to the analysis of the policy functions, Figure 11 shows that w f approximately matches the expected value of w under the optimal contract. (Note that w cuts w f from below.) Of course, w f increases with the value of the state since current compensation is adjusted based on last period's performance. The expected values of the policy functions appear in Table 3 .
[ INSERT FIGURE 11 HERE] [INSERT Figure 12 we can see that v f and v cross once in the interior of Y , and that v f cuts v from below. This confirms the intuition that to some extent v f approximately matches the expected value of v. Moreover, this indicates that since effort must be induced by deferred compensation, v f must exhibit more variability than v. This insight is confirmed by the information contained in Table 4 .
Conclusion
In this paper we studied simple dynamic principal-agent models with moral hazard. By fixing the level of effort recommended every period we were able to characterize the optimal contract analytically. Furthermore, since the structure of the model allows us to obtain first-order conditions, we can calculate the residuals induced by our numerical computations and in this way assess the quality of these computations. Additionally, since the methods required to compute these models are very flexible, alternative contractual arrangements can be analyzed easily. We conduct such analysis comparing the features of the full-commitment contract with those of a contract emerging from a onesided commitment model, and those of a contract emerging from a model where current compensation is a constant function of the observable outcome. In both cases the principal spent more compensating the agent, and the additional amount increases with the value of the state.
Our numerical analysis shows long-run distributions of discounted utility that vary with the initial condition. Indeed, the simulations reported in this article suggest that these limiting distributions are ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. An interesting feature of these distributions is that they show that the average discounted utility of the agent grows over time, and it grows faster for agents that start with lower utility entitlements. Similar results exist in the adverse selection literature. For instance the model with full commitment of Green (1987) and the one-sided commitment version of Phelan (1995) find distributions with growing average consumption. (ii ) Partition W j and find the sequence {ω i } ∈ W j such that there exist u and v that satisfy
, and define w j = ω 1 and w j = ω ni .
(iii ) End of Iteration: If |w j+1 − w j | ≤ T OL and w j+1 − w j ≤ T OL, stop; else, increment j by 1, and return to step (ii).
Algorithm 2 Dynamic Programming Algorithm.
(i ) Initial step: Select a tolerance level T OL and an initial guess C 0 .
(ii ) Value function evaluation: Let
(iii ) End of iteration: If |C n+1 − C n | ≤ T OL, stop; else, increment n by 1, and return to step (ii). 
